A selection of the best from recent issues of the Philosopher

Engaging because it deals with some of the most interesting and neglected questions of moral philosophy, infuriating because just when one thinks one has got a handle on the argument one is presented with ideas of seemingly impenetrable complexity. This of course is not necessarily the fault of Kennett, philosophy has never claimed to be simple and the complexity lies as much in the philosophers presented as with any stylistic infelicities. Still one always hopes that a couple of readings will allow one to follow the arguments, particularly when the book begins by stating that philosophy an common sense have in many areas been at odds with one another. 

Kennett's thesis is that philosophy has unjustly ignored 'common sense' moral philosophy and that it does so at its peril. Her primary aim is to show that such philosophy can be articulated and defended against the attacks which philosophers have made on it. Kennett does not privilege common sense because of its ubiquity nor because of any Marxian belief in the sound reasoning of the masses, but because of its meritorious nature. As she states, common sense is, at its best, 'the distillation of accumulated human wisdom about common human experience; it is the very embodiment of reason'.

On the issue of responsibility, Kennett sees three different ways that this can be viewed from the standpoint of common sense. An individual can be reckless, they can be weak or they can be compulsive. Where we place people (and ourselves) on this spectrum determines how we conceive of an individuals responsibility and culpability, this later area being examined in some detail in the final chapter on the problem evil-doers. Here Kennett uses two fictional examples: Jeffrey, from the film The Vanishing - a paedophile; and two from real life: Jeffrey Dahmer and Heinrich Himmler. Together they are used to explore the issue of moral responsibility. 

Kennett concludes that Raymond, who it will be remembered abducts and interns a young woman and later her boyfriend, is the only one of the four who cannot be held morally responsible, a conclusion which is, on the face of it, counter-intuitive. Yet, Kennett would argue that those who lie outside the moral realm in a sort of existential vacuum cannot be made subject to the same moral codes as the rest of us, primarily because they lack the ability to undertake moral determinations as to their actions. Kennett is clear that this does not absolve them from responsibility itself, but simply takes it out of the moral realm. This is, of course, an extremely important topic in the light of recent thinking regarding those with severe dangerous, usually psychopathic personality disorder, who would also lack such moral judgement. It is in these case examples that the book comes alive.

It is in the penultimate chapter, on moral failure and moral responsibility, that the strands of the book are drawn together and it is here that Kennett concludes that common-sense moral psychology deals comfortably with the common cases. Now I think this is a reasonable conclusion, although I remain to be convinced that the distinctions - between recklessness, weakness and compulsion - are as discrete and sustainable as they sometimes appear. This is not only true of the everyday world in which motivations and events change with rapidity, but even more so if one considers the possibility of unconscious motivations or in a world dominated by cognitive behavioural interventions, automatic negative thoughts. 

These factors cannot be equated with mental illness per se, factors which Kennett excludes when discussing responsibility, although they are features that all of us may be subject to all of the time. As a minor aside, the issue of exclusion of major mental illness in relation to moral responsibility may not be as clear cut as assumed. What, for instance, is the moral responsibility of someone with schizophrenia who breaks the law after refusing their medication? How far should awareness of the potential consequence of ones action be taken into account when there is a possibility of doing so? If I miss a 'window of opportunity', when lucid, to engage in normative behaviour, should I be held morally responsible when I am no longer lucid? Alternatively, should my moral responsibility and any consequences that follow have to wait for my lucidity to return? It is questions like these that this book makes you think about. 

I think there are probably three audiences for this book. Firstly, those who are interested in the issue of common sense moral philosophy as part of an academic discourse. Secondly, there are those who wish to think through the idea on a practical level. Thirdly, some may want to use the book to think through certain issues related to problematic areas such as drug and alcohol addiction in which debates about recklessness, weakness or compulsion are particularly salient. 

I suspect that each of these audiences, although not mutually exclusive will take different things from the book. Probably best served are those in the first and last categories, since there is plenty of academic argument to deal with both in its own right and to foster further thoughts. It is the second group of readers that may be left slightly disappointed. 

The task that Kennett set herself in this book, of developing a 'common sense moral philosophy', is extremely important, a central concern of the Philosophical Society of England. My hope would be that Kennett will give serious consideration to writing a slightly more accessible version of this book with the interested lay person in mind. She may then reach out to an important audience that may not persevere with this book, although I for one intend to read it a few more times.  

Reviewed by Robert Hill