The Philosopher's  MILLENNIUM BOOK REVIEWS
	Introduced by Zenon Stavrinides Part VI CELEBRATION OF REALITY Nietzsche died in 1900, and in the following 100 years his work has been the subject of intensive study by philosophers, social and cultural thinkers, students of art and literature, as well as religious writers, provoking diverse responses ranging from deep admiration to ill-tempered criticism. A new book on Nietzsche's treatment of religion is examined below
	Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation and Religion  By Tyler T. Roberts  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998  xiii + 230pp. £13.95 (Pb) ISBN 0-691-00127-8  This book is absolutely fascinating. Not only is it easy to read, with key terms and key concepts readily explained, but also, it makes a worthwhile contribution to both contemporary theology and Nietzsche studies. The contention of Tyler's book is that the works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who famously pronounced upon the 'death of God', can accommodate a 'religious' reading. I use the quotation marks as the interpretation is not based on orthodox religious categories and concepts but proceeds along a post-structuralist trajectory. That is, language and linguistic concepts not only mediate but determine how human beings understand their world. The meaning of words and what they signify can be re-thought.  For instance, Tyler examines what can be understood by 'mysticism'. Traditionally it has been understood as an ecstatic experience in which the mundane is transcended and God, or what ultimately Is, is then felt, known, experienced. From such an examination, Tyler argues that Nietzsche's notion of 'affirmation' can be construed as an ecstatic celebration of 'reality', a divine appreciation of mortal life, as it were. Of course, some might comment that this constitutes a moving of the linguistic goal posts, allowing words, terms, and what they signify to mean whatever people want them to mean. This would be to engage in a larger debate concerning the claims of 'foundationalist' modernism and 'foundation-less' postmodernism than can be explored here.  Nevertheless, I found the book to be intellectually stimulating and thoroughly accessible. The content reveals a high level of erudition and competence. It is highly recommended for theologians who regard Nietzsche as a no-go area, for those who regard the religious in similar terms, and for those who value the efficacy of postmodern philosophical studies.  Reviewed  by Martin Jenkins
	Part VII LOOKING FOR GOD   AUGUSTINE ON CHRISTIAN BELIEF AND PHILOSOPHICAL SCEPTICISM St Augustine was one of the most important philosophers and theologians of late antiquity, yet his thought is little known outside the small circle of historians of philosophy specialising in that era. The reason has a lot to do with the standard undergraduate curricula in 'Anglo-Saxon' Philosophy Departments which require teaching in Plato and Aristotle, pass over the following 20 centuries in silence, and take up the story again with Descartes. A new book on Augustine could encourage and assist the study of this neglected thinker    Augustine's Critique of Skepticism: a Study of Contra Academicus By Augustine J. Curley  New York: Peter Lang, 1997  xx + 167pp., $32.95 ISBN 0 8204 3936 3    The dialogue is Augustine's first surviving work, and it was written while he was on retreat, preparing himself for baptism into the Christian faith. He had undergone a circuitous route, starting out from the simple Christian faith of his mother, through Manicheanism, and then the teachings of the New Academy, until he had finally been reconverted to Christianity by St. Ambrose. His last act before baptism was to exorcise his earlier allegiance to the Academic philosophy as represented by Cicero. Augustine does not present some philosophical arguments against the brand of scepticism adhered to by the New Academy, though they would not be effective against the more sophisticated scepticism of Sextus Empiricus  For example, he says it is contradictory to claim to know that we know nothing; we do have knowledge of logic and mathematics; and we cannot base our actions on what is 'probable' or 'like-to-truth', since we cannot know whether something is 'like-to-truth' without comparing it to the truth itself. A more persistent and interesting argument is that the Academics' wise man (who is supposed to achieve serenity through knowing that he knows nothing) cannot be wise unless he 'knows wisdom'. Here, Augustine's language reads oddly to modern eyes, especially when he personifies wisdom as a woman.  But his point is that the Academics are too defeatist in renouncing all possibility of attaining wisdom, simply because there are no natural means for establishing what it consists in. Augustine himself was in precisely such a position at the time: by embracing Christianity, he recognised that wisdom was attainable, even if he would not in fact attain it until after his baptism. Again, this runs contrary to the modern idea that you should sort out what you are committing yourself to before the act of conversion. But Augustine (both before and after his conversion) believed firmly in the distinction between esoteric and exoteric teaching in philosophy and religion. Esoteric wisdom was available only to the few, who had the intellectual ability to understand the wisdom handed down by word of mouth among initiates. Exoteric teachings, on the other hand, while failing to convey the central message, were capable of being expressed in writing, and were a sufficient guide to the good life for the mass of ordinary folk.  Augustine was still looking forward to his initiation into the esoteric doctrines of Christianity. One of the most fascinating sections of the Contra Academicus comes towards the end, when Augustine reconstructs the history of the Academy in terms of the esoteric-exoteric distinction. Originally, under Plato, the Academy was relatively open about its esoteric doctrines, although some of their deeper aspects were reserved for initiates only (for Augustine, what Plato really believed was what was revealed much later by Plotinus).  However, with the rise of more materialistic and popular philosophies, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism, the Academics feared that their esoteric teachings would be ridiculed. Their primary concern was to attack materialism, and they felt it better that ordinary folk should have no philosophical beliefs at all, than that they should be dogmatic materialists. So the exoteric philosophy of the New Academy was sceptical, even though its esoteric teaching remained the same as always. Since then, the intellectual climate had changed, and it was now possible for Platonists such as Plotinus to be more explicit than ever before about the esoteric doctrines of Platonism. Augustine's conclusion is that we can attain the truth only by relying on the authority of Christ.  However, we also need reason in order to understand it, and this is supplied through the esoteric philosophy of Plato. PhD theses turned into books do not always achieve a perfect balance between dry scholarship and the presentation of new ideas to a lay audience. The present work is no exception. I would recommend the reader to skim through the first two chapters for background material which places Augustine's dialogue Contra Academicus in context, and to concentrate on the rest of the book. The main body of the book is a detailed summary of the dialogue, with ample commentary and detailed quotations.  Curley's purpose is to show that the Contra Academicus is primarily a religious rather than a philosophical work, to be understood in the context of Augustine's religious development at the time. I find his argument thoroughly convincing. In this brief review, I have focused on just one aspect of this interesting and wide-ranging dialogue. Curley has done an excellent job of expounding and commenting on the twists and turns of the argument, and I would strongly recommend the book to anyone who wishes to go more deeply into Augustine's discussion of the New Academy  Reviewed by George MacDonald Ross
	God, Freedom and Immortality   By Jonathan Harrison  Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999  viii + 750pp., £75.00 (hb) ISBN 1-84014-836-5   As the author admits in the prologue, this book is 'mostly about God and only a little freedom and immortality'. But this in no way detracts from this well written and objective work. It could well have been entitled 'Everything you ever wanted to know about God but were afraid to ask'. It was a real pleasure to follow Harrison's reasoning, in a prose style that intimated his familiarity with the written word. Indeed, the text could be read for its salutary use of the English language.  Despite a rather ponderous beginning, a turning point of sorts occurs when Harrison quotes Chomsky to the effect that 'We have a large number of innate beliefs; rather than that we have innate knowledge' (p.86). For me this is where the book gains momentum and the reading becomes more worthwhile.  Looking for laws seems to be a preoccupation for Western thinkers, and as the author says, 'You might look for another law, but you cannot go on deducing laws from other laws ad infinitum' (p. 157). In the end certain brute facts have to be accepted. 'If there is a God' is a phrase applied to multifarious avenues of enquiry and is not treated flippantly or scornfully.  Yea or nay does not really come into play; the journey is that pleasant.
	and a PHILOSOPHY FOR THE NEW CENTURY The Future of Philosophy: Towards the 21st Century  Oliver Leaman (ed.)  London: Routledge, 1998 viii + 180pp., £12.99 (pb)  ISBN 0-415-14929-0  In her essay entitled 'The History of Modern Philosophy', Catherine Wilson cites one of the fundamental paradoxes in the assured continuance of the art of philosophy: namely, 'human folly creates the need for philosophy and at the same time cannot be satisfied by it.' She goes on to comment on the specialization of subjects and the lack of knowledge as regards to the lesser names in the honour roll of philosophers, past and present.  All of this leads to a narrower conception and appreciation of the philosopher, and the philosophy being studied by the student. Central to the arguments put forth in this collection is the chapter on ethics by Peter Edwards. He is most forthright in his scorn for the resurgence of the so-called philosophy of enlightened self-interest, which again points to the narrowing of the human spirit and imagination, by trying to put the individual ego in a vacuum and the rest perforce and erroneously 'out there somewhere'.  Maybe enlightened self-interest is nothing more than a cowardly egoist's excuse for 'enlightened self-deception', to coin a phrase. This book is wide in its sweep of the subjects of philosophical inquiry and well worth consulting in the effort to get a handle on the somewhat nebulous zeitgeist of philosophy today.    The Last Word    By Thomas Nagel  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997  ix + 147pp., £16.99 (hb) ISBN 0-19-510834-5  Thomas Nagel's book is a well argued defence of reason against the attacks of subjectivism. His insights are incisive, adroit and shining with clarity. His case is a strong one, and is no more eloquent than in the fourth chapter 'On Logic'. Here he calls into question the setting of boundaries (or lack of them) in human thought concerning the finite and infinite, and the too hasty observations and deductions that proliferate unchecked in any meaningful dialogue.  Nagel declares: 'I would prefer to say that the infinite reach of mathematical knowledge can be understood only from the inside of it; by engaging in that form of life' (p. 52). The implication here is that nothing can known from the outside. 'The rule-following practices of a linguistic community can be understood only through the substantive content of our thoughts - for example, the arithmetical ones. Otherwise they are impotent rituals' (p. 53). Thus he provides a clear illustration of the impending circularity and sterility of subjective dialogue, in that it already labours under the standard clichÚ of its own making, namely 'everything is relative'. An enjoyable and stimulating read.  These three reviewed by Anthony Appleton
	Part VIII UNDERSTANDING LINGUISTIC MEANING  In the last decades of the 19th century Gottlob Frege introduced and investigated a number of new philosophical themes which exercised a profound influence in the course and shape of philosophical work on the nature of language throughout the 20th century  Among these themes are, what it is for a sentence to have a sense and so express a thought, how the sense of a sentence is made up by the names and concepts that constitute it, and how the sense of a name determines its reference. These themes were taken up by a number of important analytical philosophers and logicians including Russell, Quine, Tarski and the best known expositor of Frege still living Michael Dummett. A new book on Dummett's theory of meaning is inevitably a discussion of a number of Fregean themes    Michael Dummett and the Theory of Meaning   By Darryl Gunson Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998  x + 172pp., £35.00 (hb) ISBN 1-84014-134-4  In this scholarly work, Darryl Gunson tells the story of the truth-conditional theory of meaning from its beginnings in Davidson and Tarski to the form it should take as the author sees it. The book begins with Davidson's suggestions for a theory of meaning and the role played by Tarski's semantic conception of truth. Some of the material in the first chapter can get quite technical but one should not be put off at this early stage; understanding in detail how Tarski's theory is applied to the predicate calculus is not essential to what is to come.  Comprehension is not helped, however, by annoying typographical errors. These continue throughout the book and whilst contradictory dating of references (e.g., p. 92) and the lack of an index are merely irritating, scattergun commas (ch. 1) and incorrect diagrams (p. 120) do not help to make what could be quite tricky material any easier to follow. The main body of the book introduces the work of Michael Dummett and his contentions for the structure of the theory of meaning  The three constraints on a suitable theory proposed by Dummett are:  (1) A suitable theory of meaning should do more than merely state the content of what speakers know when they know a language. It should also capture how this knowledge is manifested by speakers.  (2) The theory should be full-blooded. A full-blooded theory would serve to explain the concepts to a being which lacks them a 'cosmic exile' in McDowell's memorable phrase.  (3) The theory should be atomistic (or molecular) in form.  This requires that the theory should be compositional in form in order to reflect the fact that a language user understands the meaning of sentences in virtue of knowing the meaning of the subsentential parts. Throughout the main body of the book, these three contentions are discussed, developed, added to and adapted to reach the author's preferred form. In discussing the issues, Gunson brings out the important aspects and problems relating to these requirements well and is reasonably clear and easy to follow. When it comes to developing and adapting Dummett's contentions, Gunson delves deeply into the work of McDowell, Peacocke, Evans and Davies (among others) and again, his grasp and explanation of the relevant issues are good.  The major weaknesses are to be found when it comes to defending the position he arrives at. For example, towards the end of the book, Gunson is compelled to ascribe non-conceptual content to the sub-personal states causally implicated in the production of our linguistic behaviour. He rightly feels that such a notion should not simply be taken for granted and that the plausibility of his account would be enhanced if he could show that non-conceptual content is a respectable inhabitant of the mind more generally.  He attempts to show this as follows: 'Someone could be in a state of pain and therefore be aware of how it feels, without possessing the general concept of pain as a form of conceptualised content' (p. 157). His line of argument is that, as we can have conscious states which do not have conceptual contents, we must make room for non-conceptual contents. If they are found here, why should we worry about positing them elsewhere? The problem with this argument is that it only gives him non-conceptual contents when combined with the assumption that all conscious states must have some sort of content. Many notable thinkers (Ned Block for example) have, however, rejected this assumption, holding that some aspects of conscious experience are simply non-representational and hence have no content. This, however, is an issue that Gunson completely fails to consider  Although this is only one example, I felt that the author's defence of a number of substantial claims suffered from leaving too many important questions unanswered. However, this said, the book does do a good job of both discussing and developing a number of the central issues in the area, and is very useful in giving an overview of how theories of meaning have developed from their historical roots.  Reviewed by William Fish
	Part IX A PHILOSOPHY OF DIFFERENCE   Alterity and Transcendence   By Emmanuel Levinas London: Athlone Press, 1999  xxiv + 195pp., £16.99 (pb) ISBN 0-485-12152-2  Recent philosophy has sought to articulate a philosophy of difference as opposed to a philosophy of identity which has characterised Western thinking. A philosophy of difference avoids the hermetic restriction of conceptual phenomena to a self-identical construction. The forms of Plato, teleological consciousness for Hegel, historical materialism for Marx, are all philosophies of identity.  Once one is in the system, one cannot get out. Levinas attempts to break the circle of such Identitarian thinking (or totality) by a pre-conceptual break that arises from the face of 'the Other'. The Other is the locus of infinity which, by definition, cannot be reduced, thereby limited to its concept (think of the ontological argument). Infinity is irreducible to identity.  The Other escapes the violence of my reducing him/her to my categories and concepts. Experience of the Other is also an ethical experience calling upon me to let the Other be in its Otherness. In this collection of essays, the main themes of Levinas' work are touched upon and elaborated. The preface by Pierre Hayet provides a brief introduction to Levinas' work.  In Chapter One, transcendence, totality, totalisation and infinity - central terms to Levinas' philosophy - are examined through the writings of others such as Plotinus. An interesting essay is the introduction to Martin Buber's Utopia and Socialism. Contrary to economistic five year plans, Buber is concerned with facilitating a post-capitalist ethical relationship between people based on the I - Thou.  This is not that dissimilar to Levinas' concern with promoting the I - Other relation. The practical efficacy of Levinas' work becomes apparent. Yet why ought I heed the call of the other? Perhaps the naturalistic fallacy can be invoked here: just because I experience the Other does it really follow that I let him/her be? How far do I let the Otherness of the Other develop? There have to be constraints and herein lies the rub. This is a book already familiar with the thought of Levinas. It is a useful supplement to his earlier work.    POSTMODERNITY AND AFTER  The Self after Postmodernity   By Calvin O. Schrag New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999  xiv + 155pp., £7.50 (pb) ISBN 0 300 07876 5  In this short and accessible book, Schrag examines the 'self' in the wake of postmodern thinkers such as Levinas, Heidegger, Sartre and Lyotard. What are modernity and postmodernity? Modernist thought strives for a closed, inclusive philosophy resting on indubitable foundations. Platonism, Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism are examples.  All phenomena included are to be explained and what is outside the system is devalued (ignorant, unbeliever, irrational and bourgeois accordingly). As such, modernist philosophy is said to have oppressive consequences. Postmodernity eschews closed, inclusive, foundationalist thought, preferring to be open to what is different, Other, or to use the jargon, Alterity. The postmodern 'self' is not fixed in nature or essence but in a permanent process of becoming through Being-with Others in activity, community and transcendence.  The process is determined by 'narrative' or conceptual/linguistic texts. All of human experience is so articulated. Narrative exists prior to the socialisation of individuals and is in turn modified and created anew by them (hence the self is open to being reconstituted by modified narratives). What of an ethics? As the 'Other' is essential to the ontological constitution of the self, the 'Otherness' of this Other is to be upheld as an ethics or it is denied by being subsumed to the Same (or identity), as befitting modernism  Why ought I respect the Other? Firstly, narrative is both descriptive and prescriptive, overcoming the infamous separation of is from ought. Secondly, as the self possesses 'conscience', this permits the eliciting of a 'fitting response' for specific circumstances in the complexity of life - a complexity modernist/absolutist ethics cannot anticipate. Conscience allows a responsiveness to previous actions and the critique of existing ones. I found this contentious but excellently stimulating. Schrag's book is an informative introduction to contemporary philosophy (even though it seems to polemical at times) and its practical applications.  Recommended to you, the Other.  These two reviewed by Martin Jenkins
	Part X PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT The notion of the human spirit, and the kindred notion of the soul, do not rest comfortably in the analytic philosophy that has dominated the 20th century in Anglo-Saxon countries. These are not the notions one finds in scientific psychology either. Yet there will always be some thinkers who, precisely because they are themselves uncomfortable with the dominant scientific images of the human person, employ these old-fashioned notions to offer their accounts of the human predicament. An attempt to claim the notion of the spirit for a new kind of scientific account of the human predicament is bound to be challenging    The Answers Lie Within Us: Towards a Science of the Human Spirit   By Alistair Sinclair Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998  xiii + 142pp., £32.50 (pb) ISBN 1-84014-576-5    There is an interesting trend being identified by historians and sociologists that is coming to be considered as one of the characteristics of our age. In the aftermath of the 'disenchantment' brought on by modernism with its dry, neutral 'scientific' approach to the human subject, we are seeing a backlash in which there is a strong desire to see the spiritual side of human existence satisfactorily accounted for.  The type of spirituality sought is not, however, of the sort that modernists set out to eradicate in their anti-supernaturalism witch-hunt. Instead it is spirituality without God, it is Descartes's 'inward turn' taken as the ultimate end. This quest expresses itself in different ways, but one major strand is that of the approach which seeks this spirituality but is uncomfortable with simply rejecting the methodology of modernism. It is into the latter category that Sinclair's volume firmly falls.  As its title suggests, the book is a concerted effort to account for the spiritual dimension of human existence in the scientific terms characteristic of modernist reductive naturalism. Such an attempt is potentially interesting, but unfortunately Sinclair fails to deliver on this promise. The book is poorly argued and displays little grip on the areas of debate into which it thrusts itself. The first section of the book, entitled 'What this book is about', provides an overview of the reasons behind the growing desire to re-establish contact with the spiritual side of the human self, and attempts to indicate why belief in God is not an acceptable means of doing so. This latter aspect is dealt with particularly poorly, and depends for its impact solely on arguments of the 'every schoolboy knows' and ad nauseam variety  The philosophy of religion has emerged with a vengeance as a credible field of inquiry in the past twenty years or so, yet Sinclair chooses to completely ignore the state of play in this arena, instead building his position on fatuous grounds. Having completely failed to establish himself properly, Sinclair then moves on to 'an outline of this proposed science' in which he ventures into the arena of philosophy of mind and action as his platform. Once again his grip on the relevant arguments seems at best tenuous, and many of his conclusions are built on shaky grounds to say the least. On the whole, this book, while potentially interesting, fails to engage in any real sense.    Reviewed by Deane-Peter Baker   The Revelation of Being    By Don Cupitt London: SCM Press, 1998  116pp. £8.95 (Pb) ISBN 0-334-02744-6    The most important theme in this book is the consistent mismanagement of our emotional, aesthetic, and philosophical make-up  Cupitt considers first the philosophical, psychological and metaphysical deliberations of the mind in terms of the triad of Being, Man and Language. He offers some highly illuminating views, but the final upshot of his discussion is simply that it is good to be alive. He raises his triad to the lofty heights of the Christian Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and argues in effect in support of G. B. Shaw's observation that 'If there were no Gods man would invent them.'  The author proceeds to investigate the inability characteristic of people in Western societies to adjust their emotions to their own tendency to worship objects in an ephemeral sense. This paradoxical position is the cause of their deep sadness and anxiety. This last review from Anthony Appleton Return to: Parts I to V of the Millennium Books Review     These pages prepared and edited by Zenon Stavrinides, Michael Keaney and Martin Cohen. Any comments? Email: thephilosophicalsociety@yahoo.co.uk