| REVIEWS
A selection of the best from recent issues of the Philosopher
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Naive Metaphysics ? |
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The Philosopher's verdict:leaps off the page! |
Naive Metaphysics by Geoffrey Klempner Avebury Series in Philosophy, 1994 |
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Do not be misguided by the title of this book! The title is not an invitation for the lay person to effortlessly tour the history of metaphysical thought. Naive Metaphysics is not directed towards an audience of naive readers. Instead, Klempner is using the title to make a self-deprecating reference to his own naivete in his approach towards the problems. So, at no point within the 274 pages does Klempner offer the reader a summary of what has been previously argued within this field. Kant's transcendental Idealism is explored, assessed and reduced to a form of egotism in fewer paragraphs than are awarded to a single thought experiment and, similarly, Berkeley's Idealism receives less discussion than Dr. Johnson's famous stone-kicking response. The ungenerous may accuse Klempner of arrogance for this apparent dismissal of other philosophers, but the willing reader, will delight in Klempner's enthusiasm for his subject whilst accepting his avoidance of the historical mantle of analytical philosophy as nothing more damning than a naive approach to metaphysics. The central theme of this book is our relationship to the world. Klempner's working assumption is that the subjective world and the objective world are sharply delineated and that the major problem in metaphysics is the comprehension of the contradiction of these two worlds. This problem is approached dialectically. Initially the dialectic seems familiar and unsophisticated, the egocentrist and the non-egocentrist positions are explored from the point of their appeal to one's intuitions and neither position appears satisfactory, It is a fact, that I am going to die; but my subjective standpoint cannot see it. Equally, it is a fact that I exist; but the objective standpoint cannot see that Klempner rapidly refines these opposing positions, borrowing from other philosophers but explaining their positions in his own words. Klempner sets out a two world metaphysic in which both the objective world and the subjective world are acknowledged, on pain of self-contradiction. Each of us must recognise the reality of our own subjective standpoint simultaneously with the objective. Klempner argues that the subjective and objective standpoint must be seen as two distinct and contradictory realities each staking a claim for the whole of reality. In the latter half of Naive Metaphysics Klempner attempts to reconcile these perpetually conflicting worlds. At times the argument appears rambling and unguided, as Klempner perhaps rather ponderously approaches his theory through chapters on realism and anti-realism, determinism and indeterminism, theories of time and notions of self-identity. It is interesting, but give the reader a sense that although Klempner has a theory which he wants to communicate, he is unable to find the appropriate context. They do not gel together to illuminate Klempner's theory, as I believe he intended, instead they fragment the argument by applying it too widely in too few pages. I sometimes thought that I had glimpsed what Klempner was trying to say, but these glimpses did not make up an entire picture - Klempner's metaphysic is fascinating but I am not confident that this book enabled me to understand the entire theory behind it. The problem, with metaphysics in general. may be being restricted to the medium of written language but depending upon reference to things which cannot be explained by language. Klempner acknowledges this problem - we have to use language in order to defeat language, to undermine the claim of the statement to comprehend all the facts that go to make up the world. But an acknowledgement of a problem does not reduce its effect. Klempner has created a two world metaphysic in which the philosopher cannot say anything about one of the worlds. I enjoyed reading Naive Metaphysics, I found the book difficult in parts and this is partially because I lack the thorough knowledge of other philosophers whom Klempner mentions, borrows from and dismisses (the less naive reader might perhaps be better off), and partially because I strongly felt that Klempner wanted to say more than the written word enabled. At points the communication did seem to go beyond the written word, Klempner's thought experiments leap off the page and preoccupied me for days afterwards, but overall I felt that the book's failing was the philosophical one of the insurpassability of the written medium. Reviewed by Zoe Fowler
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Never mind what The Philosopher says, I want to download a free copy - take me to the bookshop! |